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Price Waterhouse: Alive and Well
Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act
by H. Lane Dennard, Jr.*
and
Kendall L. Kelly**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Judicial application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
19671 ("ADEA") may be the most divergent of the employment discrimination laws because the ADEA is a hybrid of two statutes: Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 19642 ("Title VII") and the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938' ("FLSA"). The ADEA incorporates only selected portions
of each of these statutes.4 For example, the general prohibition against
age discrimination contained in the ADEA parallels the substantive
provisions of Title VII, while the remedial provisions mirror, at least in
part, the FLSA. Courts, however, have generally approached the ADEA
in the same way as they approach Title VII because of the statutes'
shared goal of prohibiting discrimination.
However, this similarity of approach changed when Congress passed
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,' amending Title VII and other civil rights
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1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634 (West 1999 & Supp. 1999).
2. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
3. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
4. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e; 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 209-219.
5. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1992).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

laws. Although the amendments to Title VII were broad, Congress made
only one express change to the ADEA's procedural provisions. The
courts, therefore, have been left to interpret congressional silence with
respect to the ADEA's substantive provisions, such as the applicability
of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' a Supreme Court case overruled in part
by the 1991 amendments to Title VII, in "mixed-motive" discrimination
cases.
The authors of this article argue that Price Waterhouse still applies to
ADEA cases despite the fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled
parts of that decision as applied to Title VII. The narrower purpose of
the ADEA itself, as described by the Supreme Court in Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins,' and the ADEA's origins in the FLSA, differentiate the
ADEA from Title VII, especially with respect to attorney fees, and
support the continued vitality of Price Waterhouse in ADEA cases. Part
II describes the changing demographics in the United States and how a
growing pool of older workers necessarily increases the importance of the
ADEA. This section also focuses on the number of ADEA charges filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Part
III analyzes the origin of the specific provisions of the ADEA and
discusses the differences between the ADEA and Title VII resulting from
the ADEA's hybrid construction and origins in the FLSA. Part IV
reviews the evidentiary burdens of proof in ADEA cases and examines
the mixed-motive analysis in particular. This article concludes with the
authors' contention that Price Waterhouse, as applied to the ADEA,
survives the 1991 amendments to Title VII because of Congress's silence
as to the role of mixed-motive analysis under the ADEA, the differing
structures of the remedies provisions under the ADEA and FLSA in
contrast to Title VII's construction, and the different remedial goals of
the ADEA.
II.

THE CHANGING DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE UNITED STATES

WORKFORCE

A. An Aging Workforce
The recent tightening of the labor market in the United States has
encouraged many employers to recruit older workers. As a result,
workers in their fifties and sixties are finding jobs more easily.
Moreover, older workers are expected to continue to participate in the

6. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
7.

507 U.S. 604 (1993).
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workforce in growing numbers.' This older workforce is a result of the
large baby-boom generation which completed its entry into the workforce
in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Because the workforce will have an
ever-increasing pool of ADEA-protected employees as potential plaintiffs,
the ADEA is certain to continue to figure prominently in equal
employment law litigation.
Despite the current boom in the U.S. labor market and the strength
of the economy, however, restructuring and reorganization continue to
impact many employers.9 During the first two months of 1999, there
were more job-cut announcements than there were during a comparable
period in 1998.10 Because many employers will continue to experience
restructuring and reductions in force, the ADEA will continue to figure
into these workforce changes.

B. EEOC Statistics
Despite the aging of the American workforce, the ADEA represents a
declining percentage of the total employment discrimination charges

8. In 1987 the Hudson Institute published a study that predicted the extent to which
the workforce would age by the beginning of the next century. For example, in 1970 the
median age of employees was 28, but by 2000 the median age is predicted to be nearly 40.
At the turn of the century, workers aged 35 to 44 will dominate the labor force. Blue
Wooldridge et al., Changing Demographicsof the Work Force: Implicationsfor the Design
ofProductive Work Environments-An ExploratoryAnalysis, 15 REv. OF PUB. PERSONNEL
ADMIN. 3, Summer 1995, at 60-72. In addition, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates
the 55-and-older population will substantially grow by the end of 2005. Howard N.
Fullerton, Jr., Labor Force Projections:The Baby Boom Moves On, MONTHLY LAB. REv.,
Nov. 1995, at 3. By 2005, over 56.7 million workers aged 45 and older will be in the
workforce, an increase of 41.77% from 1994. Moreover, the number of workers aged 55 and
over is expected to increase to 22.1 million in 2005, an increase of 36% from 1994. Id.
9. Over three million layoffs have occurred over the past five years, and more than
45% of American companies have reduced their workforce every year since 1990. PRICE
PRITCHETT & RON PouND, THE EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE 2 (3d
ed. 1996). Another recent study reports that while only 12% of U.S. workers feared job loss
in 1981 when the country was in the middle of a recession, 37% of the current workforce
is concerned about job security even with the tightest job market in two generations.
Susan Mclnerney, GreenspanSays Job InsecurityStill High;Data Show More Dissatisfaction with Pay, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 31, Feb. 17, 1999, at AA-1. According to the
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH"), longer work hours and
fears of downsizing are contributing factors that prompt new concerns over workplace
stress and its association with adverse health effects such as heart disease. Dean Scott,
Longer Hours, Growth in Service Jobs Stressing Workforce, NIOSH Head Says, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) No. 50, Mar. 16, 1999, at A-4.
10. CompaniesAnnounced 61,870 Layoffs in February;Up From Same Period in 1998,
DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 45, Mar. 9, 1999, at A-2.
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filed with the EEOC. 1' For example, charges alleging race discrimination and sex discrimination have consistently exceeded those filed under
the ADEA.
Total Number of
Individual Charge
Filings-All Types
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

Number of Individual
ADEA Charge Filings

63,898
72,302
87,942
91,189
87,529
77,990
80,680
79,591
77,444

17,550
19,573
19,809
19,618
17,416
15,719
15,785
15,191
14,141

% of Total
Charges
27.5
27.1
22.5
21.5
19.9
20.2
19.6
19.1
18.312

While EEOC statistics do not yet reflect the impact of the aging
workforce, employers have started to feel the monetary effect of ADEA
claims. In 1996, for example, employers paid $40.9 million in reported
settlements of ADEA claims, an increase of $13.6 million since 1990.13
III.

ELEMENTS OF THE ADEA

A.

Substantive Provisions
The ADEA applies to private sector employers with twenty or more
employees, 4 labor unions, employment agencies, and the federal
government. 5 The law also protects U.S. citizens aged forty and above

11.

Charge Statistics,(last modified Jan. 12, 2000) <http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.

html>.
12. Id.
13. Graying Baby Boomers Raise Issues of Discrimination,Management Styles, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 62, Apr. 1, 1997, at C-1.
14. For the purpose of counting employees, the employer must look to whether an
employer-employee relationship exists, even though the employee may not have actually
worked or received compensation on a particular day. Walters v. Metropolitan Educ.
Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 206-08 (1997) (adopting the "payroll method," which determines
the existence of an employment relationship by looking for an individual's appearance on
the employer's payroll).
15. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 630(b)-(d), 633a(a). The Supreme Court recently held that although
Congress made a clear statement of its intent to abrogate the States' immunity under the
ADEA, Congress did not have authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
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employed overseas by American corporations or by foreign corporations
controlled by an American employer."6
The ADEA prohibits discrimination against individuals forty years of
age or older.' 7 In that sense, the ADEA mirrors Title VII in prohibiting
discrimination in employment."8 Reverse age discrimination is not
barred by the ADEA because employees are not protected until they
reach age forty. A person forty years of age or older, however, can allege
age discrimination against an employer who gives preferential treatment
because of age to younger employees also within the protected age
category. 19

make that abrogation. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640, 650 (2000).
16. 29 U.S.C.A. § 630(f).
17. Id. § 631. When originally enacted, the ADEA only protected individuals 40 to 65
years of age. Congress raised the age ceiling to 70 in 1978 and in 1986 removed the upper
age limit entirely.
18. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against any individual "with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(2). It
further provides that an employer may not "limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (1999); see also O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996); Showalter v. University of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 190 F.3d 231,
235-36 (3d Cir. 1999) (61-year-old laid-off employee could establish prima facie case of age
discrimination because the retained-over-40 employees, at ages 45 and 52 were "sufficiently
younger" than the plaintiff).
In the Title VII context, the issue of whether it is essential to the plaintiffs prima facie
case that he must have been replaced by an employee outside the protected class is not so
clearly established. See Cumpiano v. Banco Santander Puerto Rico, 902 F.2d 148, 155 (1st
Cir. 1990) ("[11n a case where an employee claims to have been discharged in violation of
Title VII, she can make out the fourth element of her prima facie case without proving that
her job was filled by a person not possessing the protected attribute."); Meiri v. Dacon, 759
F.2d 989, 995-96 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a standard requiring plaintiff to demonstrate
he was replaced by person outside of protected class is "inappropriate and at odds with the
policies underlying Title VII."). Other circuits conclude only that a plaintiff is not
precluded from establishing a prima facie case if he or she cannot prove the replacement
employee is not from the protected class. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d
344, 352-54 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff was not foreclosed from "proving that the
employer was motivated by her gender (or other protected characteristic) when it
discharged her" when she was replaced by another woman); Carson v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 159 (7th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ("That one's replacement is of another
race, sex, or age may help to raise an inference of discrimination, but it is neither a
sufficient nor a necessary condition."); see also Nieto v. L & H Packing Co., 108 F.3d 621,
624 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 14 F.3d 1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1994);
Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993); Jackson v. Richards Med. Co.,
961 F.2d 575, 587 n.12 (6th Cir. 1992); Howard v. Roadway Express, Inc., 726 F.2d 1529,
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The ADEA's prohibition of discrimination against applicants or
employees based on age applies to all aspects of employment including:
hiring, discharges, treatment during employment, advertising, and
retaliation. Therefore, employers are prohibited from the following:
1. failing or refusing to hire or discharging any individual or
otherwise discriminating "against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of
20
such individual's age;"

2. limiting, segregating or classifying "employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect21 his or her status as an
employee, because of such individual's age;"

3. reducing
the wage rate of any employee in order to achieve ADEA
22

compliance;

4. discriminating against an employee or applicant for employment
because such individual has opposed any practice made unlawful under
the ADEA or because such individual has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated23 in any manner in an ADEA investigation,
proceeding, or litigation;
5. printing or publishing any notice or advertisement relating to
employment by such an employer "indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on age;" 24 or

6. establishing or maintaining an employee pension benefit plan
which requires or permits, in the case of a defined benefit plan, the
cessation of allocations to an employee's account or the reduction of the
rate of an employee's benefit accrual,26 or "in the case of a defined
contribution plan, the cessation of allocations to an employee's account,

1534 (11th Cir. 1984). In contrast, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's dismissal
of a sex discrimination claim by a man because the plaintiff was replaced by another man.

See Brown v. McLean, 159 F.3d 898, 905 (4th Cir. 1998) ("In order to make out a prima
facie case of discriminatory termination, a plaintiff must ordinarily show that the position
ultimately was filled by someone not a member of the protected class."), cert. denied, 119
S. Ct. 1677 (1999). The court in Brown did recognize three potential exceptions to this
rule: (1) age discrimination cases in which a plaintiff is replaced by a younger person also
within the protected class; (2) cases in which there has been a significant period of time
between the adverse action against plaintiff and the decision to hire a replacement also
within the protected class; and (3) cases in which hiring another person within the
protected class was calculated to disguise discrimination against plaintiff. Id. at 905-06.
20. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1).
21. Id. § 623(a)(2).
22. Id. § 623(a)(3).
23. Id. § 623(d).
24. Id. § 623(e).
25. Id. § 623(i)(1)(A).
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or the reduction of the rate at which amounts are allocated to an
employee's account, because of age."2"
An employer can avoid liability under the ADEA by proving any of the
following: age is a bona fide occupational qualification; the adverse
action was based on a reasonable factor other than age;27 observance
of a bona fide seniority system; 28 observance of a bona fide benefit
plan;29 or "discharge or ...
30

discipline [of] an individual for good

cause."
While these substantive provisions are rooted in Title VII, the
remedial and procedural provisions of the ADEA have their origins in
the FLSA.
B.

Remedial and ProceduralProvisions

1. Individual Remedies. The ADEA's remedial provisions mirror
those provided in the FLSA. 3' For example, in Lorillard v. Pons,32 the
Supreme Court stated that Congress's decision to enforce the ADEA in
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures of the FLSA
evidences congressional intent to allow jury trials in ADEA cases.3
Therefore, in an action for damages brought under the ADEA, an

26. Id. § 623(i)(1)(B). Under the ADEA an employer cannot have a seniority system or
employee benefit plan that requires or permits involuntary retirement of any protected
individual because of his or her age. Id. § 623(f). The ADEA does provide an exemption,
however, that permits an employer to compel the retirement of an employee who is
employed either as a bona fide executive or a high policymaker upon reaching age 65,
provided the employee satisfies the age, tenure, executive status, and financial criteria
under the exemption. Id. § 631(c)(1). This exemption applies only if the bona fide
executive or high policymaker "is entitled to an immediate nonforfeitable annual
retirement benefit from a pension, profit-sharing, savings, or deferred compensation plan,
or any combination of such plans, of the employer of such employee, which equals, in the
aggregate, at least $44,000." Id.
27. Id. § 623(f)(1).
28. Id. § 623(2XA).
29. Id. § 623(f)(2XB).
30. Id. § 623(f)(3).
31. The FLSA requires employers to pay the prescribed minimum wage to employees
who are "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or [are]
employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce." 29 U.S.C.A. § 206(a). Moreover, the FLSA prohibits the employment of
workers for more than 40 hour work weeks unless the worker receives at least "one and
one-half times the regular [hourly] rate." Id. § 207(a).
32. 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
33. Id. at 577-85.
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34
individual claimant is -entitled to a jury trial on factual issues,
regardless of whether equitable relief is sought.35 Despite this established right to a jury trial under the ADEA, an individual suing under
Title VII did not have a similar right until the Civil Rights Act of 1991
allowed for a jury trial in cases where a plaintiff claims compensatory
or punitive damages.3"
A plaintiff prevailing on a claim of discriminatory discharge under the
ADEA is generally entitled to both back pay and reinstatement to his or
her former position. 37 Where reinstatement is not feasible or is
inappropriate, the plaintiff may be entitled to prospective relief,
commonly referred to as "front pay." However, a defendant may limit
the plaintiff's damages by offering the individual reinstatement to his
old job or a substantially equivalent job. If a reasonable curative offer
from the defendant/employer is rejected, the defendant's liability for
continuing back pay ceases and the plaintiff forfeits the right to
reinstatement or front pay." The Supreme Court has reasoned that
the defendant's liability ends "if [the plaintiff] refuses a job substantially
similar to the one he was denied."39

34. The EEOC also has a right to a jury trial when bringing an ADEA case. See EEOC
v. Indian River Transp. Co., 33 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 862 (M.D. Fla. 1982); but cf.

EEOC v. Emory Univ., 47 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 642 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (holding that
the EEOC is not entitled to a jury trial when only equitable relief is sought because the
ADEA only provides a jury trial when recovery of amounts owing is sought).
35. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(c)(2). An ADEA plaintiffs entitlement to front pay is to be
determined by the court on the theory that front pay is an equitable remedy. Wells v. New
Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 238 (6th Cir. 1995). Courts, however, are split on whether
the court or the jury is to calculate the amount of the front pay award. See Downes v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 41 F.3d 1132, 1141 (7th Cir. 1994) (jury should not determine
amount of front pay award); Wells, 58 F.3d at 237 (determination of amount of front pay
award is jury question).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (1994). The right to a jury trial under the ADEA may be
waived, however, if a timely demand is not made pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs ignorance of the right to a jury trial or the
procedure for making a jury demand normally does not excuse the failure to make a timely
demand. See Washington v. New York City Bd. of Estimate, 709 F.2d 792, 797-98 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding that a pro se plaintiff waived his right to a jury trial where he failed to make
a timely demand, even if the waiver may have resulted from ignorance of the rule).
37. Back pay is generally calculated from the date of the adverse employment action
and incorporates the compensation (including benefits) that would have been received
absent the discriminatory act less interim earnings.
38. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982); Lewis v. Federal Prison
Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1277, 1279 (11th Cir. 1992); Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d
708, 709 (11th Cir. 1987).
39. FordMotor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-32.
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A willful violation of the ADEA, moreover, entitles the plaintiff to an
award of liquidated damages in the form of double back pay.4 ° The
Supreme Court has defined willful conduct as requiring either reckless
disregard or knowledge that the conduct was prohibited.4
This
liquidated damages scheme has its origins in the FLSA and is not
included in Title VII. Under Title VII, such damages are not available;
however, a plaintiff can claim compensatory and punitive damages that
are unavailable under the ADEA.42
The ADEA also provides that successful plaintiffs are entitled to
reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs.4 s While an award of
attorney fees is mandatory to a prevailing plaintiff," the amount of the

40. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b).
41. Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 126 (1985); see also Ryther v.
KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1089 (8th Cir. 1996), affd on rehearingen banc, 108 F.3d 832 (8th
Cir. 1997) (finding sufficient evidence to support jury's finding that employer television
station willfully discharged the plaintiff when it refused to renew his contract under the

pretext of his low market rating); Weaver v. Amoco Prod. Co., 66 F.3d 85, 88 (5th Cir.
1995) (finding that a piece of the conversation between the plaintiff and his supervisor
supported jury's finding of willful violation when employer forced his retirement).
42. While the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Title VII to allow claims for
compensatory and punitive damages, Congress did not provide for the same allowance of
damages under the ADEA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); see also Johnson v. Al Tech
Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143, 147 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding compensatory damages
unavailable under the ADEA); Perrell v. FinanceAmerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th
Cir. 1984) (holding plaintiff could not recover compensatory damages under the ADEA);
Clark v. Sun Elec. Corp., No. 95C76, 1995 WL 708567, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 1995)
(finding claim for punitive damages improper because such damages are unavailable under
the ADEA); Moses v. K-Mart Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1054, 1058-59 (S.D. Fla. 1995)
(disallowing recovery of punitive damages under state law and liquidated damages under
ADEA because it would constitute double recovery). The lack of a similar amendment to
the ADEA further highlights the remedial differences between the two statutes.
43. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (incorporating section 216(b) of the FLSA). By contrast, a
prevailing defendant is not entitled to attorney fees under the ADEA itself, but courts have
held that such fees may be awarded to the successful defendant in exigent circumstances
under other statutory or case law authority. See Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135
F.3d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 405 (1998) (holding that attorney
fees can be awarded to a prevailing ADEA defendant only if the plaintiff litigated in bad
faith); EEOC v. 0 & G Spring & Wire Forms Specialty Co., 38 F.3d 872,883 (7th Cir. 1994)
(reading FLSA and ADEA to determine that common law attorney fees rule should be
applied to prevailing defendants); Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 260
n.1 (1st Cir. 1986) (permitting defendants to obtain attorney fees in ADEA cases under
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)).
44. Whether a plaintiff is "successful" is sometimes difficult to determine. Generally,
courts compare a successful plaintiff to the parallel reference in civil rights statutes, the
"prevailing party." See Nance v. Maxwell Fed. Credit Union, 186 F.3d 1338, 1343 (11th
Cir. 1999) (interpreting ADEA's attorney fees provisions under prevailing party standard).
But see Salvatori v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 190 F.3d 1244, 1245 (1lth Cir. 1999) (Birch,
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attorney fees is left to the discretion of the trial judge. Under Title VII,
by contrast, the trial judge retains discretion as to whether a prevailing
party should recover attorney fees.45
2. Collective Actions. Class actions highlight another feature of
the ADEA distinct from Title VII. While in most federal class actions,
including those brought under Title VII, issues such as joinder and
notice to potential class members are governed by Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, class actions under the ADEA do not proceed
under Rule 23.46 Rather, most courts have held that ADEA class
actions are governed by section 216(b) of the FLSA, which provides the
procedures for representative or collective actions.47 Under this section,
no person can become a party plaintiff to an ADEA action unless that
person affirmatively "opts into" the class by filing written consent with
the court.4
The pursuit of an ADEA "collective" action generally involves two
steps. The first step is the "notice stage," which begins when a plaintiff
seeks court authorization to issue notice of the lawsuit to other potential
plaintiffs. In the notice stage, the district court determines-usually
based only on the pleadings and any affidavits that have been submitted-whether notice of the action should be given to potential class
members. Because the court has very little evidence, this determination
is made under a fairly lenient standard and typically results in

J., concurring) ("[Our decision to construe the ADEA as requiring what is tantamount to
a 'prevailing party' status for purposes of a litigant's entitlement to attorney's fees is not

self-evident from the plain language of the statute.").
45. While the ADEA, by reference to the FLSA, states that the court "shall, in addition
to any judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to
be paid by the defendant," Title VII provides that the court "in its discretion, may allow
the prevailing party ... a reasonable attorney's fee." Compare 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b), with
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(k). See also Salvatori v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 190 F.3d 1244,

1245-46 (11th Cir. 1999) (Birch, J., concurring) (noting the ADEA incorporates the attorney
fee provisions of the FLSA).
46. See Anson v. University of Tex. Health Science Ctr., 962 F.2d 539, 540 (5th Cir.
1992) (ADEA class action must conform to requirements of FLSA and not "opt-out"
provisions of Rule 23); Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579 (7th Cir. 1982)
(ADEA class action governed by the FLSA and not Rule 23); La Chapelle v. Owens-Illinois,
Inc., 513 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[I1t is crystal clear that [the FLSAI precludes pure
Rule 23 class actions."). But cf. Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1456,
1461 (D. Colo. 1995) (class action under the ADEA must satisfy both the FLSA and Rule
23).
47. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b).
48. Id.
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If the district

court conditionally certifies the class, putative class members are given
notice and the opportunity to opt-in to the collective action.5 ° Therefore, because a representative action under the ADEA follows the
procedures of the FLSA rather than Rule 23 as with Title VII, there are
no absent class members as in Title VII class actions because all
potential plaintiffs must opt into, rather than opt out of, the ADEA suit.
The second step usually occurs after all persons have filed consents to
opt into the lawsuit, discovery is largely complete, and the matter is
ready for trial. This stage is typically precipitated by a motion for
"decertification" by the defendant. The court now has much more
information on which to base its decision and makes a factual determination on the question of whether the putative plaintiffs are similarly
situated. If the claimants are similarly situated, the district court allows
the representative action to proceed to trial. Otherwise, the case is
severed into separate lawsuits. Neither the FLSA nor the ADEA defines
the similarly situated standard.5 1 Thus, the Rule 23 requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation do
not apply to representative actions under the ADEA; rather, the only
prerequisite is that the putative plaintiffs be similarly situated as set
forth in the FLSA.
3. Waivers of Age Claims. Employees often enter into waivers of
potential ADEA claims in exchange for consideration from the employer.
Waivers (or "releases") most commonly arise in the context of a
termination where an employee signs a release of any and all claims for
acts occurring during his or her employment or termination in exchange
for a payment or other consideration to which the individual was not
otherwise entitled. Despite this common practice, the proper analysis of
waivers caused confusion among the courts and practitioners alike

49. See Grayson v. K-Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1096 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that the
FLSA's "similarly situated" requirement is less stringent than the standard for joinder or
for separate trials and citing with approval case recognizing that similarly situated
requirement is considerably less stringent than requirements of Rule 23(b)(3)).

50. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(b). A putative plaintiff who does not file a charge with the EEOC
may join a class action by relying on the timely filing of the charge of the named plaintiff
only if a written consent to opt-in is filed before the statute of limitations has run on the
putative plaintiffs individual claim. Grayson, 79 F.3d at 1105.
51. Some courts have given the words a broad interpretation. The Eleventh Circuit has
stated that in FLSA cases the plaintiff must make a showing that the individual claimants
are similarly situated "with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay

provisions." Dybach v. Florida Dep't of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (11th Cir.
1991). However, the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue of similarity in the
context of an ADEA case.
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because the ADEA was initially silent with respect to whether individuals could enter into waivers unsupervised by the Department of Labor
("DOL"). A tension existed between Title VII and the FLSA as to which
approach courts should take.52 While courts allowed a knowing and
voluntary waiver of claims under Title VII, the ADEA's waiver provisions more closely mirrored the FLSA. The FLSA allowed for waiver
agreements by the DOL, but it was silent as to unsupervised waivers.53
In 1990, however, Congress resolved this growing debate when it enacted
the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act 54 ("OWBPA"), which amends
the ADEA and defines the requirements that must be met for the waiver
of a covered employee's rights to be valid under the statute.55 To be
valid, the waiver must be "knowing and voluntary."56

52. See generally Robert G. Haas, Waivers Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Putting the FairLabor StandardsAct to Rest, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
382 (1987); Ronald Turner, Release and Waiver of Age Discriminationin Employment Act
Rights and Claims, 5 LAB. LAW. 739 (1989).
53. 29 U.S.C.A. § 216(c).
54. Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1991).
55. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(f)(1). The OWBPA also protects employee benefits from age
discrimination and effectively overturned the Supreme Court's ruling in Public Employees
Retirement System of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), which allowed some distinction
based on age with respect to employee benefits.
56. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(f)(1). A waiver will not be considered "knowing and voluntary"
unless it meets the following requirements:
(A) the waiver is part of an agreement between the individual and the employer
that is written in a manner calculated to be understood by the individual;
(B) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under [the ADEA];
(C) the individual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the date
the waiver is executed;
(D) the individual waives rights or claims only in exchange for consideration in
addition to anything of value to which the individual is already entitled;
(E) the individual is advised in writing to consult with an attorney prior to
executing the agreement;
(F)(i) the individual is given a period of at least 21 days within which to
consider the agreement [(45 days if pursuant to an exit incentive or other
employment termination program offered to a group of employees)];
(G) the agreement provides that for a period of at least seven days following the
execution of such agreement, the individual may revoke the agreement, and the
agreement shall not become effective or enforceable until the revocation period has
expired ....
29 U.S.C.A. § 626(f)(1). If the waiver is pursuant to an exit incentive or other employment
termination program offered to a group of employees, the following information must be
provided: (1) a description of the group covered by the program, (2) any eligibility factors
for the program, and (3) the job titles and ages of all individuals selected for the program
and the ages of all individuals in the same job classification or organizational unit who are
not selected. Id. § 626(f)(1)(H); see also Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., .189 F.3d 1221, 1229
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With the OWBPA, Congress affirmatively addressed the previously
unresolved issue of voluntary waivers under the ADEA. By enacting the
OWBPA, Congress approved unsupervised waivers, but only under
strictly specified conditions that do not apply to Title VII.
C.

The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A Deafening Silence

Despite their procedural and remedial differences, the ADEA and Title
VII initially had a parallel course of substantive development in the
courts. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 eliminated some of that consistency.
Although, as explained below, Congress made an express change to the
statute of limitations period under the ADEA, it was silent as to all
other provisions of the statute. Even more significant, the revisions
made to Title VII (for example, the availability of compensatory and
punitive damages) were not carried over to the comparable provisions of
the ADEA.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expressly amended the statute of
limitations periods under the ADEA for actions initiated by individuals.
Congress eliminated the two-year (non-willful violations) and three-year
(willful violations) statute of limitations period for actions filed under
the ADEA, which were originally patterned after the provisions in the
FLSA."7 Instead, Congress imposed a requirement like that found in
Title VII in which an individual claimant must file suit within ninety
days of receipt of a right-to-sue notice from the EEOC.58 Unlike Title

(10th Cir. 1999) (extending analysis beyond the OWBPA and applying "totality of the
circumstances" test to determine whether waiver was knowing and voluntary); Lloyd v.
Brunswick Corp., 180 F.3d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing age discrimination claim
where plaintiff signed waiver that tracked the requirements of the OWBPA); Griffin v.
Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 62 F.3d 368, 373-74 (11th Cir. 1995) (must examine the validity of
a waiver under the requirements of both the OWBPA and other "knowing and voluntary"
factors).
The EEOC also published regulations defining the proper procedures for compliance with
the OWBPA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22 (1999). A plaintiff who signs an invalid release of
ADEA claims under the OWBPA does not have to return the benefits he or she received
before suing. See Oubre v. Entergy Operations, Inc., 522 U.S. 422, 428 (1998).
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1994).
58. Compare 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)(1), with 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(e). While the DOL
originally implemented and enforced the ADEA, jurisdiction currently lies with the EEOC.
See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626. The EEOC gained jurisdiction over the ADEA in 1979 when
President Carter instituted a reorganization plan to consolidate the federal government's
equal employment enforcement efforts. See 5 U.S.C. § 906 (1994). An individual claiming
a violation of the ADEA must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within 180
days of the alleged unlawful act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(1). In deferral states the charge
must be filed within 300 days of the alleged unlawful act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d)(2). The
requirement that individuals alleging age discrimination must timely file a charge of
discrimination prior to commencing a civil action under the ADEA is not a jurisdictional
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VII, however, the ADEA provides that an individual can institute a civil
action under the ADEA before receiving a right-to-sue letter so long as
he or she waits sixty days after filing a charge alleging unlawful age
discrimination with the EEOC.59 This is another example of the clear
difference that exists between the ADEA and Title VII.
ADEA
Under the ADEA and Title VII, a plaintiff can allege (1) discrimination
IV.

EVIDENTIARY FRAMEWORK OF THE

that affects a disparate impact on a protected class or (2) intentional
discrimination, also called disparate treatment. The plaintiff may prove
intentional discrimination either through direct or circumstantial

prerequisite to filing a civil action in federal court, but instead is a procedural prerequisite
akin to a statute of limitations. Because of this distinction, timely filing is subject to
waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling. However, the complete failure to file an age
discrimination charge with the EEOC, a jurisdictional requirement, will bar the hearing
of an ADEA claim in federal court. Like the time frame for the filing of a charge, the 90day period for filing suit is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing an individual court
claim, but rather is subject to equitable tolling. For example, a claimant may attempt to
show that the failure to file was in some way caused by the EEOC. Because the EEOC
may choose to bring suit on behalf of an individual when, as a result of the investigation,
it has found that reasonable cause exists to believe discrimination, in violation of the
ADEA, has occurred, the elimination of the statute of limitations arguably leaves the
agency with an unlimited amount of time within which to initiate suit as it is not a "person
aggrieved" as specified under the statute of limitations provision. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b)-(c);
see also Howard Eglit, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 111014 (1993).
59. 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d). See Hodge v. New York College of Podiatric Med., 157 F.3d
164, 168 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that unlike Title VII plaintiffs who must wait for a "rightto-sue" letter, ADEA plaintiffs need only wait 60 days after filing the EEOC charge). Title
VII requires that a "person aggrieved" receive a right-to-sue letter before initiating legal
proceedings. Acting pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2), the EEOC sometimes issues a
right-to-sue letter "early" when it determines that it will not be able to complete the
administrative processing of the charge in less than the 180 days provided by statute. The
circuits are split as to whether the EEOC's regulation is valid. See Martini v. Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing complaint filed based
upon an early right-to-sue letter prior to time when 180 days had elapsed); Stetz v. Reeher
Enters., Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123-25 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Rodriguez v. Connection
Tech. Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (same); Montoya v. Valencia County,
872 F. Supp. 904, 906 (D.N.M. 1994) (same). But cf. Sims v. Trus Joist MacMillan, 22 F.3d
1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 1994) (upholding EEOC's regulation); Brown v. Puget Sound Elec.
Apprenticeship & Training Trust, 732 F.2d 726, 729 (9th Cir. 1984) (same); Berry v. Delta
Air Lines, 75 F. Supp. 2d 890, 892-93 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss based on
"early" right-to-sue letter); Connor v. WTI, 67 F. Supp. 2d 690, 693-94 (S.D. Tex. 1999)
(same); Thomas v. BET Sound-Stage RestaurantBrettCo, Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 448, 458-59
(D. Md. 1999) (same).
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evidence. The McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green60 prima facie case
framework was developed to "compensate" for the fact that direct
evidence may be difficult to supply in intentional discrimination
cases. 1 When a plaintiff can produce direct evidence of discrimination,
of course, McDonnell Douglas does not apply.
At least partially because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended
substantive provisions of Title VII, without similarly amending the
ADEA, some courts have not applied the same evidentiary framework
under these two statutes. This divergence is evident in cases where
plaintiffs allege disparate impact.
A.

DisparateImpact
The law governing the application of the disparate impact theory to
ADEA cases is not well settled. The disparate impact theory requires
the plaintiff to show that a facially neutral employment practice or
policy has a discriminatory effect on the protected class. In Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins,s2 a sixty-two year-old employee was fired by his employer just weeks before his pension would have vested.' The Supreme
Court held that without more, discharging an employee to prevent his
pension benefits from vesting does not violate the ADEA."4 More
importantly, the Court called into question the availability of the
disparate impact theory as applied to the ADEA.66 In doing so, the
Court pointed out one of the over-arching differences between the
purposes of the ADEA and Title VII.6 '

The Court stated that the

ADEA was enacted to address the concern that stigmatizing stereotypes
were depriving older workers of jobs, a problem that is eliminated when
an employer's decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age. 7
This is true even if the motivating factor is correlated with age. Thus,
the Court noted, without deciding, a facially neutral employment
practice might not be violative of the ADEA, even if it had a disparate

60.

411 U.S. 792 (1973).

61. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
62. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). The Supreme Court also held that to establish a "willful"
violation of the ADEA warranting liquidated damages, the plaintiff needed to show that
the employer either knew or showed "reckless disregard" for whether its conduct was
prohibited by the ADEA. Id. at 614-17.
63. Id. at 606-07.
64. Id. at 612-13.
65. Id. at 609-10.
66. Id. at 612-14.
67. Id. at 610-11.

736

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

impact on older workers.68 The circuits are split as to whether the
disparate impact theory is applicable to age discrimination cases, but
most circuit court decisions since Hazen appear to have rejected the
theory.69 The Eleventh Circuit has yet to decide the issue. 70 By
contrast, the viability of the disparate impact theory under Title VII is
clear both from the Supreme Court's interpretation of the language of
Title VI' 7' and the codification of this interpretation in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.72
B. Disparate Treatment
Courts have modified the elements of proof and burden-shifting
schemes used in Title VII disparate treatment cases for use in cases
brought under the ADEA.7' An ADEA disparate treatment claim can
arise as a pretext or a mixed-motive claim; each type of claim has
slightly different proof analyses.7 4
1. Pretext Cases. To prove discrimination under the pretext
analysis, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie
case of unlawful age discrimination to create a presumption that the
68. Id. at 612-14. Prior to Hazen several circuits permitted disparate impact cases
under the ADEA. See Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1163 (7th
Cir. 1992); Maresco v. Evans Chemetics, 964 F.2d 106, 115 (2d Cir. 1992); EEOC v.
Borden's Inc., 724 F.2d 1390, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State
College, 702 F.2d 686, 690 (8th Cir. 1983).
69. See Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696,699-704 (1st Cir. 1999) (disparate impact
claims cannot be brought under the ADEA). Mullin makes this holding despite recognizing
that Title VII and the ADEA contain similar language prohibiting discrimination. See id.
at 700; see also Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007 (10th Cir. 1996); Lyon v.
Ohio Educ. Ass'n and Prof'l Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138-39 (6th Cir. 1995); DiBiase v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[In the wake of Hazen, it is
doubtful that traditional disparate impact theory is a viable theory of liability under the
ADEA."); EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994). Only two
circuits permit disparate impact cases under the ADEA. See Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196
F.3d 358 (2d Cir. 1999); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 191 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir.
1999).
70. See Turlington, 135 F.3d at 1437 n.17. The Ninth Circuit has recognized the
general trend of post-Hazen cases to reject disparate impact in age discrimination, but
implied in Mangold v. CaliforniaPub. Util. Comm., 67 F.3d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1995), that
it might still follow its earlier decision in Borden's and permit such cases.
71. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-32 (1971).
72. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k).
73. See St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
74. See Watson v. Southeastern Penn. Transp. Auth., Nos. 98-1832, 98-1833, 98-1834,
2000 WL 291159, at *4-9 (3d Cir. Mar. 20, 2000).
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employer unlawfully discriminated against him or her because of age.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, plaintiffs must establish a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence.
To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination in the hiring
context, for example, it must be shown that: (1) the plaintiff is forty
years old or older; (2) the plaintiff applied and was qualified for a job for
which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) the plaintiff was rejected
despite being qualified; and (4) after this rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
plaintiff's qualifications or the position was filled by a younger person.75
If the plaintiff claims discriminatory failure to promote, the plaintiff
must show instead that other equally or less qualified employees outside
the protected class were promoted to satisfy the fourth element of the
prima facie case.7"
For a plaintiff to make a prima facie case of age discrimination in the
discharge context, it must be shown that plaintiff. (1) is forty years old
or older; (2) was subject to adverse employment action; (3) was qualified
for the job; and (4) was replaced by a younger employee.77 If the
employer engages in a reduction in force, the criteria for plaintiff to
establish a prima facie case are altered so that plaintiff must show
instead "evidence by which a fact finder could reasonably conclude that
the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of age in reaching
[the adverse] decision," rather than simply showing replacement by a
younger individual.7" When a particular job "is entirely eliminated for
nondiscriminatory reasons, ... [plaintiff] must show that he. was
qualified for another available job with that employer; qualification for
his current position is not enough."79
If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie case and create a presumption of discrimination, the employer must then articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action. Once
the employer carries its burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision, the presumption initially established by the
plaintiff is negated. Because the ultimate burden of persuasion stays
with the plaintiff at all times in a pretext case, the plaintiff must
discredit the employer's proffered reason for its actions once the

75. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,312 (1996); Eskra
v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1411 (11th Cir. 1997); Earley v.
Champion Intl Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir. 1990).
76. See Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1539 n.11 (11th Cir. 1997).
77. See Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998).
78. Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1532 (11th Cir. 1996).
79. Earley, 907 F.2d at 1083.
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employer satisfies its burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision.80 A plaintiff can satisfy this
burden by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered
reasons were not the true reasons for the employment decision. In other
words, a plaintiff must persuade the trier of fact that a discriminatory
reason more likely than not motivated the employer, or that the
employer's explanation is unworthy of belief. This three-step burdenshifting analysis is normally triggered when an employee lacks direct
evidence or comparable circumstantial evidence to create an inference of
intentional discrimination. The employee retains the burden of proof
throughout.
These issues become particularly difficult to parse at the summary
judgment stage. Courts disagree as to the quantum of evidence required
to survive summary judgment in pretext cases. Under the so-called
"pretext-plus" standard, a plaintiff must come forward with sufficient
evidence to create triable issues as to whether the defendant's proferred
reason was false, or a pretext, and whether discrimination was the real
reason for the employer's action in order to survive summary judgment.
The First, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits apply the pretext-plus standard."
Since the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 2 however, other circuits have adopted a "permissive-pretext"

80.

In a discrimination case based on circumstantial evidence, the plaintiff can avoid

judgment as a matter of law by putting on prima facie evidence sufficient to discredit all
of the defendant's proffered reasons for its actions in the mind of a reasonable juror. See
Combs, 106 F.3d at 1543. Moreover, some courts now hold that a plaintiff does not create
an issue of fact showing pretext by selectively choosing one person outside the protected
class who was treated more favorably. See Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 645-46
(3d Cir. 1998).
81. See Hidalgo v. Overseas Condado Ins. Agencies, Inc., 120 F.3d 328, 337 (1st Cir.
1997); Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997) ("plaintiff cannot
succeed by proving only that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual," but rather
must show pretext "'and that discrimination was the real reason'") (quoting Hicks, 509
U.S. at 515); Theard v. Glaxo, Inc., 47 F.3d 676, 680 (4th Cir. 1995) (for plaintiff to prevail,
she must prove "'both that [defendant's reason] was false and that discrimination was the
real reason'") (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515).
82. 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Various readings of Hicks paradoxically provide support for
both the "pretext-plus" and the "pretext-only" analysis, Compare Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511
(rejecting pretext-only in noting that a mandatory inference compelling judgment for
plaintiff after a mere finding of pretext would shift the burden of proof to the defendant),
and id. (rejecting pretext-plus in holding that the "factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put
forward by the defendant ... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case,
suffice to show intentional discrimination"), with id. at 515 (plaintiff must show "both that
the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason"), and id. at 519 ("It is
not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the
plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.").
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analysis.8 3 Under this standard, a finding of pretext permits, but does
not require, a finding of discrimination.8 The Supreme Court recently
granted certiorari in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,85 to

resolve this issue.
2. Mixed-Motive Cases. The mixed-motive analysis applies when
both legitimate and illegitimate factors are, or could have been,
considered by the employer in making the questioned employment
decision."6 Mixed-motive cases, however, arise only when the plaintiff
offers direct evidence of discrimination in the employment decision.
Thus, courts do not engage in the burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas
analysis.8 7 As a result, under a mixed-motive analysis, the plaintiff
essentially begins by focusing on the alleged discrimination itself,
whereas the plaintiff in a pretext case begins by focusing on the
plaintiff's own qualifications and the employer's needs.
8
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"
the Supreme Court defined the
mixed-motive analysis. There, a plurality of the Court, with two justices

83. For a description of the three approaches relating to pretext cases, see Kenneth R.
Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-ShiftingApproach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOKLYN L. REv. 703, 714-16 (1995) (describing pretext-plus, pretext-only,
and permissive-pretext).
84. This regime is sometimes described as pretext-only. This label is slightly
misleading, however, because in most permissive-pretext circuits, a finding of pretext does
not automatically assure a victory for the plaintiff; rather, it permits, but does not compel,
a determination of discrimination. See Jackson v. E.J. Brach Corp., 176 F.3d 971, 984 (7th
Cir. 1999); Kline v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 347 (6th Cir. 1997); Ryther v.
KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 837-38 (8th Cir. 1997) (permitting finding of intentional
discrimination based on prima facie evidence and pretext); Combs, 106 F.3d at 1535-38;
Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1069-72 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc)
(determination that defendant's proferred reason is pretextual, coupled with evidence that
establishes prima facie case, permits finding of intentional discrimination); Barbour v.
Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421,
1433 (9th Cir. 1993) (same).
85. 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 444 (1999).
86. See Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1185 (2d Cir. 1992).
87. See Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1208 n.4 (10th Cir. 1999)
("Generally, a mixed motives analysis only applies once a plaintiff has established direct
evidence of discrimination."); Eskra v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 1406, 1411
(11th Cir. 1997) (If the plaintiff can present direct evidence that a "discriminatory animus
played a significant or substantial role in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the
employer to show that the decision would have been the same absent discrimination.");
Shook v. St. Bede Sch., 74 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (same). If, however,
no direct evidence of discrimination is available, and the plaintiff relies on circumstantial
evidence, then the court simply applies the McDonnell Douglas paradigm. See Evans v.
McClain of Ga., Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 963 (11th Cir. 1997).
88. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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concurring, established a burden-shifting framework different from that
outlined in McDonnell Douglas.89 Under the mixed-motive analysis, a
plaintiff is obligated to present evidence, at the outset, that the employer
relied on an impermissible consideration in making its employment
decision. Often in mixed-motive cases, plaintiffs rely on the remarks,
conduct, and attitudes of people in the workplace to demonstrate direct
evidence of discrimination. In order to be considered direct evidence, the
conduct or remarks must be made by the decisionmaker or someone
having influence on the decisionmaking process. 9 Stray remarks are
not sufficient proof to shift the burden to the defendant.91 If the
plaintiff convinces the factfinder that the employer in fact relied on an
illegitimate factor in making the employment decision, the employee has
proved that the decision was made at least in part "because of" an
illegitimate factor, and the plaintiff has successfully shifted the burden
of proof to the employer.92 Thus the plaintiff's initial burden is heavier
than the less onerous burden in pretext cases.93
Although the quantum of evidence needed to satisfy the plaintiff's
initial burden is somewhat unclear, the plurality in Price Waterhouse
referred to the Supreme Court's decision in Mt. Healthy City School
District Board of Education v. Doyle,94 in which the Court held that
plaintiff shifted the burden of proof to defendant when he had shown
that his constitutionally protected speech was a "substantial" or
"motivating factor" in his adverse treatment. 95 When the Price
Waterhouse plurality opinion is read in conjunction with the concurring
opinions of Justices O'Connor and White,96 it is clear that the motivating factor requirement should be read as requiring the same proof as
that needed to prove that the illegitimate factor was a substantial
consideration in the adverse decision. 7

89. Id. at 243-50.
90. See Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1563-64 (11th Cir. 1997) ("'The biases of one
who neither makes nor influences the challenged personnel decision are not probative in
an employment discrimination case.'") (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990)); Dilla v. West, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 (M.D. Ala.
1998).
91. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J. concurring in the judgment).
92. Id. at 277-78.
93. See Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1185.
94. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
95. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248-49 (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287)
(plurality opinion).
96. Id. at 258-79 (White and O'Connor, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
97. Any difference between the two terms may be so slight as to be negligible. In Owen
v. Thermatool Corp., 155 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1998), the court recognized that although "the
phrase 'motivating factor' is perhaps a more precise and more typical statement of the
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Once the plaintiff establishes that an impermissible factor played a
motivating part98 in the employment decision, the burden shifts to the
employer to prove that its decision would have been the same without
"[Tihe defendant may avoid a finding of
an illegitimate motive."
liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the
[impermissible factor] into account.""° That is, the defendant bears
the burden of proof at this stage and can avoid liability altogether if it
meets that burden.
With the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress partially
overruled the Supreme Court's holding in Price Waterhouse to preclude
a defendant from using the "same-decision" rationale as an affirmative
defense to avoid all liability in a Title VII case. Thus, Congress
amended Title VII to limit only the employee's remedy, rather than
defeating liability outright, if the employer shows it would have made
the same employment decision regardless of any demonstrated discriminatory motive.
Section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 provides that an
unlawful employment practice is established when "the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice." 01 Second, section 107(b) states
that if a plaintiff proves a violation of section 107(a), even if a defendant
proves that it "would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor," the court may make a finding of
liability and grant declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney
fees."0 2 Therefore, if the employer demonstrates that the same decision
would have been made even absent the discriminatory motive, the court

standard for liability in ADEA cases, the trial court's use of 'substantial factor' adequately
stated the law in this case." Id. at 139 (noting that the "words 'substantial' and
'motivating' are reasonably interchangeable or at least have considerable overlap"). In the
context of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), the Seventh Circuit has
determined that a "motivating" factor need not be the only factor, but it must be a
substantial factor in the challenged action. See Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d
1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1999). The court further noted that the "impermissible consideration

must contribute to the adverse employment decision in some substantial way." Id.
98. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality opinion); id. at 259 (White J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Siwik v. Marshall Field & Co., 945 F.Supp. 1158, 1162-64 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
99.

100.
101.
102.
relief or

Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion).

Id.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
Id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). The court cannot award other damages such as monetary
reinstatement or hiring.
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may not award damages or require reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.

However, it may prohibit the employer from considering the discriminatory factor in the future and award declaratory relief and attorney fees
and costs.
Courts are split as to whether section 107 applies to the ADEA. 10 3
Several well-reasoned decisions have found that this section does not
apply to claims brought under the ADEA because the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 amends Title VII, not the ADEA. Furthermore, the plain
language of the section does not refer to age discrimination as one of the
protected classifications." ° Those courts holding to the contrary have
assumed that section 107 applies to ADEA claims, apparently because
case law developments under the ADEA, such as the burden of proof
requirements for disparate treatment claims, have closely tracked case
law under Title VII. 105
Statutory construction dictates that courts should examine the plain
meaning of section 107. Section 107, on its face, does not apply to age
claims. Not only does the section solely amend Title VII, it specifically
defines as impermissible the consideration of race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin as "a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice.""° Therefore,
the lack of reference to either the ADEA or to age in section 107 strongly

103. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1303 n.17 (11th Cir. 1999) (noting
that under Title VII, defendant's demonstration that the employment decision would have
been made absent the discriminatory motive does not relieve employer of liability
altogether, but [iin other areas of employment discrimination law, however, this showing
is a complete defense").
104. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172 (2d Cir. 1993); Lewis
v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261 (N.D. Ala. 1999) (in the
retaliation context); Donovan v. Dairy Farmers, Inc., 53 F. Supp. 2d 194, 197 (N.D.N.Y.
1999); Mumaw v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 19 F. Supp. 2d 786, 790 (S.D. Ohio 1998); Sanderson
v. City of New York, No. 96-Civ. 3368 (LLS), 1998 WL 187834, at *3 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21,
1998); Nelson v. Shoney's, Inc., No. Civ. A. 96-2199, 1997 WL 567957, at *7 n.2 (E.D. La.
Sept. 10, 1997); Siwik v. Marshall Field & Co., 945 F. Supp. 1158, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
Similarly, courts are split as to whether section 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applies
to Title VII retaliation cases because Congress made no mention of retaliation claims in
this section. See, e.g., Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552 n.7 (4th Cir.
1999); McNutt v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 706, 707-08 (7th Cir. 1998); Woodson v. Scott
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933-35 (3d Cir. 1997); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 684 (1st
Cir. 1996); Behne v. Microtouch Sys. Inc., 58 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Riess
v. Dalton, 845 F. Supp. 742, 744 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
105. See, e.g., Fast v. Southern Union Co., 149 F.3d 885, 889 (8th Cir. 1998); Miller v.
Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483,484 (7th Cir. 1997); Gonzagowski v. Widnall, 115
F.3d 744, 749 (10th Cir. 1997); Mandavilli v. Maldonado, 38 F. Supp. 2d 180, 194 (D.P.R.
1999).
106. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m).
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suggests7 that Congress intended that section 107 not apply to age
0
cases.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents"° further illustrates the appropriateness of a divergence of
analysis between Title VII claims and those based on age. In Kimel the
Court noted that "[ollder persons, again, unlike those who suffer
discrimination on the basis of race or gender, have not been subjected to
a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment.'"'0 9 The Court further
reassured that "[o]ld age also does not define a discrete and insular
minority because all persons, if they live out their normal life spans, will
experience it.""0 As a result, it is no longer clear that substantive
analysis of age claims should parallel those of Title VII discrimination.
Moreover, the remedial scheme for age discrimination currently does not
match nor does it need to match that of Title VII.
V.

CONCLUSION

Because cases brought under the ADEA should not be governed by
section 107, Price Waterhouse should continue to apply. Therefore, a
plaintiff bringing an ADEA claim must show that age was a substantial
factor in the employment decision, and a defendant may escape liability
completely if it can establish that it would have made the same
employment decision absent a motivation based on age.
In addition to complete congressional silence on the issue, the ADEA's
roots in the FLSA's remedial and procedural provisions support a
different treatment for mixed-motive cases under the ADEA. For
example, if a defendant is not'successful in proving that it would have
made the same decision absent the unlawful consideration of age, the
plaintiff can claim that he is entitled to liquidated damages under the
ADEA. Therefore, in providing for liquidated damages in the event of
a willful violation of the ADEA, Congress has already supplied a
complete remedy to the successful plaintiff in a mixed-motive case. It is
not illogical, then, given the allowance of liquidated damages for a

107. Cf Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 931-35 (3d Cir. 1997) (applying a
similar analysis in a Title VII retaliation case); see also McNutt v. Board of Trustees, 141
F.3d 706, 709 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Legislation is often a product of compromises that are not

readily apparent to the public or even consistent in their relation to other contemporaneous
enactments from the same body. It is not the role of courts to question these kinds of
seemingly inexplicable legislative choices where they are spelled out in plain statutory
language (unless, of course, they are unconstitutional).').
108. 120 S.Ct. 631 (2000).
109. Id. at 645 (quoting Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,313
(1976) (per curiam)).

110. Id.
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willful violation of the ADEA, a provision not found in Title VII, that
Congress would have intended for an employer to avoid liability
altogether in the event that it is successful in proving the affirmative
defense based on mixed-motive.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Hazen and most recently in Kimel
indicated that there are differing rationales and remedial schemes to the
ADEA and Title VII, thereby setting the ADEA apart from Title VII.
The ADEA's provision that "[ilt shall not be unlawful for an employer
...to take any action otherwise prohibited... where the differentiation
is based on reasonable factors other than age""' should be interpreted
to mean that employers are allowed "to utilize factors other than age as
grounds for employment-related decisions that differentially impact
members of the protected class (individuals between the ages of 40 and
69). " 2 This narrower congressional directive of the ADEA could be
reason enough to warrant a following of Price Waterhouse, rather than
adopting the more lenient standard developed under Title VII.

111. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(f)(1).
112. Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 702 (1st Cir. 1999) (analyzing the
inapplicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on the ADEA in the disparate impact
context).

